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1990—2009: Special 20th-anniversary issue!

his EAP is a special issue to celebrate our
20th year of publication. It includes essays
by four scholars who have made important contributions to environmental and
architectural phenomenology. Psychologist Bernd
Jager explores how the lived nature of thresholds
plays an indispensable role in human inhabitation,
and philosopher Karsten Harries considers architecture as it might sustain physical and spiritual
shelter. In turn, philosopher Jeff Malpas refutes the
criticism of place as possession-based and exclusionary, and geographer Edward Relph delineates
a “pragmatic sense of place”—a style of reflection
and practice that looks inward toward the uniqueness of particular places but recognizes that those
places are integrally related outward to the larger-
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scale realm of other places and global interconnectedness. Editor David Seamon begins this special
issue by discussing some key concerns readers have
brought forward over the years in regard to the phenomenological efforts promoted by EAP.
Below: In the very first issue of EAP, we asked whether there
might be a phenomenologically-inspired graphics of places,
buildings, and environmental experiences. We reprinted several illustrations, including the one here, from Mary Hufford’s
One Space, Many Places (Washington, DC: American Folklife
Center, 1986). This work is a qualitative study of the “Pinelands,” a distinct natural and cultural region of coastal New
Jersey. This drawing illustrates the construction of a traditional Pinelands “crossway”—a pole road enabling woodsmen to haul cedar timber over infirm swampland. Drawing by
J. Adkins; used with permission of American Folklife Center.
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EAP/IAEP Conference Session

the end of May or in early June in conjunction with
the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities
of Canada. In addition, EPTC publishes biannual
issues of PhaenEx, a peer-reviewed, open-access
electronic journal; and a triennial electronic newsletter, About the Things Themselves. www.eptctcep.net.

The 2009 meeting of the International Association
for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) will be
held in Arlington, Virginia, October 31—November
2, immediately following the annual meetings of
SPEP (Society for Phenomenology and Existential
Philosophy) and SPHS (Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences). EAP will sponsor a
special IAEP Monday-morning session (Nov. 2) on
“phenomenological reconsiderations of conventional environmental and ecological conceptions
and problems.” Presenters include: biologist Leon
Chartrand, geographer Edward Relph, philosophers
Robert Mugerauer and Ingrid Stefanovic, and EAP
editor David Seamon.
www.environmentalphilosophy.org.;
www.spep.org/;
http://pages.slu.edu/faculty/harriss3/SPHS/.

News from Readers
We received the following email from Finish architect and phenomenologist Juhani Pallasmaa in regard to M. Reza Shirazi’s spring EAP essay discussing Pallasmaa’s phenomenological writings on architecture: “Thank you for the latest issue of EAP. I
read the review of my writings by M. Reza Shirazi.
I agree with most of his observations and see no
reason to respond [in detail]. Of course, a certain
collage-like fragmentation is the very structuring
idea of the kind of ‘fragile architecture’ that I write
about as opposed to an architecture of ‘strong image’ that aims at domination.
“Some years ago I received an unexpected
phone call from the Foreign Ministry in Helsinki
with the message that the President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (who had written the
South African Constitution with Nelson Mandela)
was on an official visit in Finland and wanted to see
me. I did not know the gentleman but welcomed
him in my office. As he entered and we greeted, he
congratulated me for my design of the new building
for the Constitutional Court in Pretoria.
“‘There must be a misunderstanding’, I said. ‘I
have lectured in your country three times but never
designed anything’. ‘Yes, you have’, he answered.
‘When I was the chairman of the building committee, I read your essay on ‘fragile architecture’
[“Hapticity and Time”] carefully and gave a copy of
it to every member of the committee, and we followed your instructions carefully’.
“Before he left my office, he gave me a video
tape of the completed Constitutional Court Building, and told me that he himself had been developing a theory of ‘fragile law’.
“This true story may interest you as an example
of a rather unexpected consequence of a piece of
architectural writing—one of the pieces, by the way,
that Mr. Shirazi reads as ‘vague’.”

Items of Interest
The conference, Flesh and Space—Intertwining
Merleau-Ponty and Architecture, will be held
Wednesday, September 9, 2009 at the Mississippi
State University School of Architecture in Mississippi State, MS. This conference will be held in
conjunction with the annual meeting of the Merleau
Ponty Circle, September 10—12. The theme of the
meeting is The Experience and Expression of
Space. Contact organizers Rachel McCann or
Patricia Locke at: www.caad.edu/merleau-ponty/.
The Third International and Interdisciplinary
Conference on Emotional Geographies will be
held at The University of South Australia in Adelaide, April 5-7, 2010. Papers are invited that “interrogate emotion, society and space from diverse disciplinary and multidisciplinary backgrounds. We are
interested in specific case studies as well as theoretical examinations of the nature of connections
among these terms.” Contact:
CPCSGlobalisation@unisa.edu.au.
The Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture (EPTC) is a Canadianbased international society of academics from various disciplines. EPTC hosts an annual conference at
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Twenty Years of EAP
David Seamon, Editor, EAP

I

t is difficult to believe that 20 years have
passed since philosopher Robert Mugerauer,
interior-design educator Margaret Boschetti,
and I met over breakfast at an annual Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA)
meeting and envisioned a publication covering phenomenological and related qualitative work exploring environmental and architectural concerns.
At that time, Boschetti and I were colleagues at
Kansas State University, and we took on the task of
co-editing a newsletter that would be published
three times a year. As a way to incorporate the wide
range of environmental scales and topics that we
wished to include, we eventually settled on the
rather lengthy title of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology, or EAP, for short.
In the 20 years since that beginning, we have
published 60 EAP issues that have included some
150 essays; 60 book and film reviews; 130 news
from readers; 350 items of interest; 470 publication
citations; and 14 poems. Topics discussed have run
the gamut from doing phenomenological research to
the controversial matter of whether and how phenomenological insights might have pragmatic value
for designers and other practitioners.
Having worked with EAP from the start
(Boschetti retired in 2002, and I became sole editor), I have come to note recurring concerns that
arise in discussions with readers and contributors.
This special 20th-year anniversary issue offers an
opportunity to highlight some of these matters.

pen spontaneously in the course of daily life. The assumption is that there is no world “beneath” or “behind” the world of lived experience, which means
that conceptual understandings and applied actions
must be grounded in this lived realm of reality.
Realizing that this relationship between experience and its secondhand depictions can be presented
in simpler and more complicated ways, we have tried
to offer a continuum of interpretive styles and venues
ranging from narrative accounts that read like stories
to sophisticated philosophical discussions that require
considerable directed effort and attention. Much less
successfully, we have attempted to offer graphic presentations that describe phenomenological insights and
principles in ways that might appeal to readers uninterested in or disinclined to expend the effort on more
cerebral, word-based presentations.
As one might expect, more philosophically inclined readers have sometimes complained that EAP
entries are not purely or rigorously phenomenological
enough, while readers less concerned with academic
precision and depth have sometimes complained that
EAP entries are too “dense” and unnecessarily complicated. We have tried to shape most EAP issues in
such a way that they offer a range of potential entry
points via different modes and tenors of phenomenological expression (with many entries not even mentioning or being aware of “phenomenology”!).
Our key assumption has been that each of us is at
a different inner place in our journey to understand
with the result that a text resonating for one reader
may make little sense or seem unimportant to another.
Our hope is that a spectrum of presentations and
“levels” allows readers to find some useful points of
entry into the possibility of phenomenological insight
and understanding.

Insights Arising from Experience
From the start, Mugerauer, Boschetti, and I agreed
that the style of understanding emphasized in EAP
should involve existential phenomenology—i.e., descriptions, interpretations, and claims regarding
human experience that are grounded in, arise from,
and return to that experience and the lived reality of
lifeworld.
In other words, the foundation for conceptual
and applied claims should be human experiences,
meanings, actions, situations, and events as they hap-

Theory & Practice Together
Throughout our 20 years of publication, we have attempted to deal with the intimidating topical and
readership range generated by an expansive thematic
like “environmental and architectural phenomenology.” Though our readership is small (never more
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sustaining buildings, robust urban neighborhoods,
lively town centers, or healthy, self-sustaining ecosystems. As much as possible, we’ve tried to present
scholarly and applied work that examines whether
and how an explicit understanding of human and nonhuman lifeworlds might assist in making those lifeworlds better.

than 150 subscribers per year), personal, occupational, and thematic interests are wide-ranging—from
intrigued general readers to researchers, designers,
builders, policy makers, artists, artisans, and the like.
One of the most difficult oppositions to hold together for such an eclectic readership is the fragile
relationship between theory and practice. Scholars
and other intellectually-focused readers may have
little concern with how ideas and conceptual arguments might be applied in realms of everyday action,
whereas practitioners and readers of a realist bent
may feel that EAP’s more conceptually aimed entries
are arbitrary, subjective, and without lasting value in
real life. Again, our device for smoothing differences
has been to present a range of themes, styles, and orientations. A central assumption is that how and what
we understand is how and what we make; therefore,
finding more accurate ways to see and think should in
turn strengthen design, planning, policy, and other
pragmatic actions attempting to make the everyday
world better.
The larger point is the extraordinarily complicated nature of peoples’ lived relationships with the
worlds in which they find themselves. One of the
most significant conceptual contributions that phenomenology offers environmental and architectural
concerns is recognition that any talk of a peopleenvironment relationship is intellectually artificial.
Existentially, people and environment are not separate and two but indivisible and one. People are inescapably immersed and enmeshed in their world—
what Merleau-Ponty called “body-subject” and Heidegger called “Dasein,” or “being-in-the-world.” Because of this lived reciprocity between self and world,
one cannot assign specific phenomena to either self or
world alone.
This fact of lived immersion-in-world has immense significance for design and policy because it
suggests that the specific physical constitution of the
world contributes to sustaining or undermining human experiences, actions, and well being. A central
question that has arisen repeatedly in our 20 years of
publication is whether we can recreate selfconsciously—through design, planning, policy, and
other creative means—places, situations, and experiences that, in the pre-modern past, typically arose unself-consciously and spontaneously, for example, life-

Allowing Things to Speak
One way that founder Edmund Husserl described
phenomenology was “to the things themselves,” by
which he meant setting aside cultural, ideological,
and conceptual prejudices so that one might be open
to the phenomenon and offer it a supportive space in
which it can present itself in a way that it most fully
and truthfully is. In today’s postmodern times (that
claim all meaning is relative, multivalent, and shifting), the phenomenological interest in foundational
structures like “place” or “lived body” is academically unfashionable. The point of view represented by
EAP has regularly been criticized by poststructuralists
and social constructionists as essentialist—i.e., as
presupposing and claiming an invariant and universal
human condition only revealed when all “nonessentials” like culture, history, and politics are
stripped away, leaving some inescapable core of human experience and existence.
I hope that the wide range of topics showcased
over the years in EAP demonstrates that a thorough
phenomenological presentation of environmental and
architectural experience requires that, in addition to
human typicality, scholarly and practical efforts must
and can explore the personal, social, and cultural dimensions of environmental, architectural, and place
experiences. Further, I would argue that these people
and place portrayals, grounded in the openness of
phenomenological method, are often more accurate
and more complete than social-constructionist or
critical accounts that too often force fit their subjects through some pre-defined set of cultural, political, gender, or socioeconomic filters and thus end
in lifeworld misrepresentation and distortion.

Making Better Worlds
As EAP Editor, I often receive inquires from graduate
students and other interested parties who wish to
know what they should read to familiarize themselves
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with phenomenological work on environmental and
architectural topics. In writing this commentary, I
suddenly realized that this might be a good time to
construct a list of useful readings, which follows.
What I have attempted is to include works that
not only offer perceptive phenomenological insights
but also hold considerable conceptual or practical
power—e.g., Edward Relph’s remarkable phenomenology of place; Paul Krafel’s superlative efforts to
“shift” perspective and thereby see the natural world
in fresh, more accommodating ways; or Christopher
Alexander’s superhuman efforts to understand the

nature of making and environmental wholeness. Certainly, there are other important works that could be
included, and I will gladly publish in future issues
any additional entries that readers forward to me.
I hope the essays of this special 20th-anniversary
issue, written by four major figures associated with
the phenomenological enterprise, demonstrate the
continuing possibilities and vigor of phenomenological work, which offers ways to better see and understand the world and thereby perhaps improve that
world through more attuned design, policy, and other
practical efforts.

Twenty-five Important Works in Environmental
& Architectural Phenomenology
This list has been compiled by David Seamon, Editor of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology. Several of the entries here are not explicitly phenomenological; they are included because they discuss important
lived aspects of peoples’ dealings with environments, places, landscapes, buildings, and the natural world. Also
note that this list does not include: (1) relevant “first-generation” texts such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Gaston Bachelard’s Poetics of Space (1958), Mircea Eliade’s Sacred and
Profane (1961), Otto Bollnow’s Human Space (1963), or Martin Heidegger’s writings on building and dwelling;
(2) edited collections; (3) discussion of the nature of phenomenology; or (4) phenomenological research methods. For introductions to phenomenology, see D. Stewart and A. Mukunis, The Nature of Phenomenology (Ohio
Univ. Press 1990); and L. Embree et al., eds., Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Kluwer 1997). In regard to
“empirical” phenomenological research, one of the best examples remains the four volumes of the Duquesne
Studies in Phenomenological Psychology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1971—1983).
what a phenomenology and hermeneutics of the natural world
might entail.

1. Christopher Alexander, The Nature of Order, 4
vols. (Berkeley, CA: Center for Environmental
Structure, 2002—05).

3. Gordon G. Brittan, Jr., “The Wind in One’s
Sails,” in M. J. Pasqualetti et al., eds., Wind Power
in View (NY: Academic Press, 2002).

This four-volume masterwork explores the nature of a particular kind of order that Alexander calls wholeness, which,
whether in nature or human-made, is the “source of coherence
in any part of the world.” He argues that, wherever there is
wholeness, there is life, which involves such qualities as good
health, well being, vitality, handsomeness, and beauty.

This philosopher and inventor details his efforts to develop a
place-based wind turbine founded in the Heideggerianinspired thinking of philosopher Albert Borgmann. A valuable
real-world example of how the way we understand founds
what we make and how we act.

2. Henri Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature (Great
Barrington, MA: Lindesfarne Press, 1996).

4. Anne Buttimer, “Grasping the Dynamism of Lifeworld,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 66 (1976):277-92.

This physicist explores the possibility of a qualitative science
of nature, drawing on the proto-phenomenological work of
Goethe. The book is an essential contribution to a “phenomenology of wholeness” and provides insightful discussion as to

This geographer provides one of the earliest efforts to identify
environmental aspects of the lifeworld—e.g., social space, sense
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of place, time-space rhythms, and the lived dialectic between
home and horizon. She recognizes that both geographical and
phenomenological thinking on the environmental and spatial
nature of the lifeworld are incomplete and need integration conceptually and practically.

bols”—essential meanings providing identity and orientation
in human life, for example, up/down, inside/outside, vertical/horizontal, light/dark, and so forth. Also see his Ethical
Function of Architecture (MIT Press, 1997).

10. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great
American Cities (NY: Vintage, 1961).

5. Edward Casey, Getting Back into Place (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993; 2nd edition, 2009).

This book could be described as an implicit phenomenology of
the city and urban lifeworld, which Jacobs interprets in terms
of a small-scaled functional and physical diversity generating
and fed by the “street ballet”—an exuberance of place and
sidewalk life grounded in the everyday goings-on of many
people carrying out their own ordinary needs and activities.

This philosopher argues for place as a central ontological structure founding human experience. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty,
Casey argues that place is important existentially partly because
of our presence as bodily beings: We are “bound by body to be
in place.” Also see his ontological history of place—Fate of
Place (Univ. of California Press, 1997).

11. Daniel Kemmis, The Good City and the Good
Life (NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1995).

6. V. Frank Chaffin, “Dwelling and Rhythm: The Isle
Brevelle as a Landscape of Home,” Landscape Journal, 7 (1989):96-106.

Drawing on the ideas of Martin Heidegger and Christopher
Alexander, this political philosopher considers the idea of urban
wholeness and healing as it might have meaning for urban politics and citizenship. A central question is how citizens’ sense of
responsibility for their place can facilitate a civilized politics.
Also see his Community and the Politics of Place (Univ. of
Oklahoma Press, 1993).

This landscape architect provides a sensitive phenomenological
study of the Isle Brevelle, a 200-year-old river community on
Louisiana’s Cane River. Chaffin moves from outside to inside
this landscape by presenting its regional history and geography,
by interviewing residents, and, finally, by canoeing the Cane
river, which he comes to realize is the “focus of the communityat-home-and-at-large.” A valuable model for phenomenologies
of real-world places and landscapes.

12. Paul Krafel, Seeing Nature (Burlington, VT:
Chelsea Green, 1998).
This book points toward a phenomenology of the second law
of thermodynamics, which says that all activities, left to their
own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibilities. As a way to counter the second law, Krafel aims to see
the natural world in new ways by shifting perspectives and
actions whereby people increase, rather than decrease, the
possibilities of the world through intentional, caring efforts
grounded in firsthand awareness and understanding.

7. Kimberly Dovey, “The Quest for Authenticity and
the Replication of Environmental Meaning,” in D.
Seamon & R. Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and
Environment (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985).
This architect argues that authentic environmental meaning is
not a condition of the physical environment but, rather, a
situation “of connectedness in the relationship between people
and their world.” He asks how buildings and environments
today might evoke a stronger authenticity and sense of place.

13. Belden C. Lane, Landscapes of the Sacred (NY:
Paulist Press, 1988; 2nd expanded edition., Oxford
Univ. Press. 2001).

8. Hassan Fathy, Architecture for the Poor (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969).

This theologian examines the relationship between place and
spirituality through four axioms that he believes will help one
“to understand the character of sacred space”: (1) sacred space
is not chosen, it chooses; (2) sacred space is ordinary place,
ritually made extraordinary; (3) sacred space can be moved
through without being entered; and (4) the impulse of sacred
space is both centripetal and centrifugal, both local and universal.

This Egyptian architect tells the intriguing story of designing
from scratch a village for 7,000 displaced Egyptian peasants
known as the Gournis. A provocative effort to understand the
Gournis’ lifeworld and to design dwellings, public buildings,
and village spaces accordingly.

9. Karsten Harries, “Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary
Architecture,” Perspecta, 20 (1983):9-20; reprinted
in D. Seamon, ed., Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993).

14. Jeff E. Malpas, Place and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999).
This philosopher provides a difficult but well-argued account
of “the nature and significance of place as a complex but unitary structure that encompasses self and other, space and time,

To circumvent the dilemma of arbitrariness in environmental
design, this philosopher calls for a language of “natural sym-
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subjectivity and objectivity.” Also see his Heidegger’s Topology (MIT Press, 2006).

20. R. Murray Schafer, The Tuning of the World
(NY: Knopf, 1977).

15. Robert Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of
Place (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994).

This book provides a history of the changing soundscape—the
sonic environment. Schafer develops concepts directly applicable to a phenomenology of the soundscape, including keynotes (a landscape’s recurring natural sounds) and soundmarks
(unique sounds that help make a place endearing).

In providing an accessible overview of phenomenological,
hermeneutical, and post-structural approaches to environmental and architectural concerns, this philosopher focuses on
the timely question of “how to have plural meaning and yet a
basis for saying that not just anything goes?” Mugerauer finds
a partial answer in what he calls “fitting placement”—a style
of understanding, design, and policy that respects and responds to social and technological needs but also encourages
the emergence of local peoples and places. Also see his Heidegger and Homecoming (Univ. of Toronto Press, 2008).

21. Theodor Schwenk, Sensitive Chaos (NY:
Schocken, 1976).
Using the approach of Goethean phenomenology. this hydrologist examines the character and patterns of water and air
in motion, which he depicts in terms of meander, wave, and
vortex. “Today,” writes Schwenk, “people no longer look at
the being of water but merely its physical value.”

16. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci (NY:
Rizzoli, 1980).

22. Eva M. Simms, The Child in the World (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 2008).

To develop a phenomenology of the spirit of place, this architectural theorist considers two key questions: (1) What are the
generalizable lived qualities of genius loci? (2) How are these
qualities expressed in particular places? (his examples are
Prague, Khartoum, and Rome). An important contribution to
understanding how qualities of the physical world contribute
to landscape and place ambience and character. Also see his
Concept of Dwelling (Rizzoli, 1985).

This psychologist offers a penetrating phenomenological account
of early childhood experience, much of which “precedes articulation.” Simms provides eye-opening chapters on embodiment,
coexistentiality, spatiality, things, temporality, language, and
historicity. One provocative claim that is effectively demonstrated: “In the young child’s experience there is no inner world.
There is also no outer world.”

17. Juhani Pallasmaa, The Eyes of the Skin (London:
Academy Editions, 1996).

23. Ingrid Leman Stefanovic, Safeguarding Our
Common Future (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000).

This architect examines how the design aesthetic of Modernist
buildings largely emphasize intellect and vision and how a more
comprehensive architecture would accommodate an environmental experience of all the senses as well as the feelings. Also
see his Encounters (Rakennustieto Oy, 2005).

In working toward a phenomenology of sustainability, this philosopher explores how place and emplacement might provide a
foothold for grounding environmental responsibilities and actions in relation to particular individuals, groups, and localities.

24. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, Archetypes in Architecture (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1987).

18. Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 1976).

This book is a stunning effort to delineate a phenomenology of
architectural experience by exploring how floor, wall, and
roof, through the lived meanings of motion, weight, and substance, evoke various degrees of inside-outside continuity or
separation. Offers an innovative way to see buildings.

Still the single most lucid and accessible demonstration of
what phenomenology might offer environmental and architectural concerns. Relph’s focus is a phenomenology of place, the
lived heart of which he identifies as insideness—i.e., the degree to which an individual or group feels a sense of belonging
and attachment to a locale or environment, which thereby existentially is transformed into a place.

25. S Kay Toombs, “The Lived Experience of Disability,” Human Studies, 18 (1995):9-23.

19. Edward Relph, Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography (London: Croom Helm, 1981).

This philosopher, afflicted with multiple sclerosis, draws on her
personal experience to construct a phenomenology of illness.
She strikingly demonstrates how an understanding of phenomenological notions like the lived body provides “important insights into the profound disruptions of space and time that are an
integral element of changed physical capacities such as loss of
motility.” Also see her Meaning of Illness (Kluwer, 1992).

This book is a powerful explication of Heidegger’s notion of
appropriation as a potential vehicle for a lived environmental
ethic grounded in respect and care for the natural world—what
Relph terms an environmental humility.
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Thresholds and Inhabitation
Bernd Jager
Jager is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Quebec in Montreal. Many of his writings (sidebar, next
page) are central to environmental phenomenology in that they explore existential dialectics often expressed in
spatial and place terms—for example, the lived tensions between dwelling and journey, insider and outsider,
house and city, or mundane and festive worlds. For thoughtful commentaries on Jager’s work, see: Essais de
psychologie phénoménoguique-existentielle: Réunis en homage au professeur Bernd Jager, Christian Thiboutot,
ed. (Montreal: CIRP, 2007); this volume includes a bibliography of Jager’s writings. The following essay is extracted from a longer paper, “Toward a Psychology of Homo Habitans: A Reflection on Cosmos and Universe,”
presented at the annual International Human Science Conference held at Ramapo College, Mahwah, New Jersey, June 2008. bernd@ican.net. © 2009 Bernd Jager.

T

a neah-gebür, or neighbor, means to be a “neardweller” who “builds,” “farms,” and “dwells”
(buan) “nearby” (neah) in such a way that he or she
must cross a threshold and perform the proper rituals to come into the presence of other near-dwellers.
The cosmos, understood as a neighborly world,
is reflected or replicated in all inhabitable structures. A house, temple, or city is not only marked by
thresholds. Each also manifests an absolute and material limit made manifest in foundations, roof, and
walls. The walls separating one house or town from
the next may be understood as representing the
memory of a painful, original division overcome
through the gate or doorway. This original division
cannot ever be completely healed or overcome. It
must be accepted as a first condition for building a
human life and dwelling in a human way.
We are reminded here of the birth of an infant,
understood as a first and painful separation from an
all-providing mother. We think here also of the
Genesis myth of Eve’s creation out of a rib taken
forcibly from Adam’s chest and of the story of
Adam and Eve being chased from Paradise. We find
this theme of a fateful, original separation also
elaborated in the Aristophanic myth as it is told in
Plato’s Banquet. This myth represents the birth of
humankind as the result of a punishment meted out
to an earlier non-human race of arrogant giants who
refused to maintain neighborly relations with the
gods. To curb their arrogance, Zeus cut each of
them in half, thereby hoping to make them more
responsive to both the gods and to each other.

he distinguishing trait of human habitation
is that it establishes and honors thresholds
that cannot be reduced to relationships of
force. A threshold can be crossed only by
mutual agreement: It represents a symbolic relationship that has distanced itself from mere instinct, appetite and brute impulse. As such, it constitutes the
foundation for prayer and sacrifice as well as for
dialogue, love, and friendship.
A threshold embodies the typical and unique
ways human beings are linked, both to the Earth and
to the heavens and to their earthly and heavenly
neighbors. It represents a limit that all at once separates and binds human beings to what surrounds,
undergirds, and overarches their existence.
Approached in this way, the threshold constitutes the ultimate foundation of a human world reflected in all building projects from the most primitive cave or hut to the most magnificent palace or
city, all of which we might even consider as mere
variations on the theme of the threshold, the essential function of which is to hold separate and distinct worlds together.

W

e think of a cosmos as an inhabited world
shaped and ordered by customary limits and
divided by hospitable thresholds in such a way that
human and divine encounters become possible. The
fundamental order of the cosmos is, therefore, a
moral order, guided by custom and ritual and governed by a threshold that both separates and symbolically unites human and divine neighbors. To be
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This operation was at first unsuccessful because the separated halves found no way to mutually interact to form a cosmos and create a human
world. They succumbed to loneliness and despair.
The gods then reshaped the halves so they could
face, talk, and make love to each other. These new
creatures could then dwell and relate to each other
as neighbors. In this way, so the myth tells us, human beings were born.

walls and thresholds, a cosmogonic narrative that
tells of the coming into being of a human world
marked by neighborly relations.
Every threshold that guards an inhabited domain repeats the myth of a primordial and perfect
unity that preceded the building of walls and the
creation of a human world. The walls speak of the
disturbance of that unity, while the thresholds speak
of the subsequent miracle of love and desire that
ordered a cosmos and made it a place fit for human
and divine habitation.

Some Writings by Bernd Jager

W

1971

Horizontality and Verticality: An Exploration into Lived
Space. In A. Giorgi et al., eds.. Duquesne Studies in
Phenomenological Psychology, vol. 1 (Duquesne Univ.
Press).
1975 Theorizing, Journeying, Dwelling. In A. Giorgi, et al.,
eds., Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology, vol. 2 (Duquesne Univ. Press).
1976 The Space of Dwelling. Humanitas, 12.
1985 Body, House and City: The Intertwinings of Embodiment,
Inhabitation and Civilization, In D. Seamon & R.
Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment (Columbia Univ. Press).
1992 From the Homestead to the City. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 23 (2).
1998 Human Subjectivity and the Law of the Threshold. In R.
Valle, ed., Phenomenological Inquiry in Psychology (NY:
Plenum).
2001 Psychology and Literature, Journal of Phenomenological
Psychology, 32 (2).
2007 Memories and Myths of Evil: A Reflection on the Fall
from Paradise. In Essais de psychologie phénoménoguique-existentielle. C. Thiboutot, ed. (Montreal: CIRP;
ISBN 978-0-9781738-6-9).

e should note here that a cosmic or inhabitable space always refers to a space and a
time that is inherently dual or plural, insofar as inhabitable worlds or domains necessarily point to
neighboring ones. Within a house or city, we are
never totally enclosed, since walls are interrupted
by windows and doors that speak of the surrounding
world. An inhabitable domain inevitably makes reference to actual or potential other worlds with
which it forms a meaningful whole. To inhabit a
home means to inhabit at the same time a neighborhood, a city, and a world. We cannot truly inhabit a
cosmos without maintaining viable relations with
neighbors and neighboring worlds.
An ancient Greek proverb boldly proclaims that
it is impossible to be human in isolation from other
human beings. “Eis aner oudeis aner” can be translated as “one man, detached from all others, ceases
to be human.” If we extend the logic of that proverb, we can conclude that a house that offers no
pathways to other houses and neighbors ceases to be
a place fit for human habitation. That logic also reminds us that, if the Earth were to become detached
from the heavens, it would no longer be able to
shelter human beings in a human way.
The essential dynamic of a cosmos concerns
ongoing relationships between what might be called
cosmic or neighboring pairs, the first of which is the
Earth, understood as the dwelling place of mere
mortals; and the heavens, understood as the dwelling place of divine and immortal beings. The
heaven-Earth relationship would thereafter be recreated in the bond between mortal and immortal
beings or in that of host and guest, man and woman,
child and adult, or native and stranger.

M

yths about humanity’s genesis are at the same
time cosmogonic in that they relate the creation of a divine and human cosmos. In light of Biblical and Platonic myths, we come to understand the
building of walls and the construction of houses,
domains, and cities as acts of material affirmation
of an original, divine act of separation that broke a
perfect, undivided world apart and opened the prospect of a divided, yet neighborly, cosmos.
If walls express consent to separation, we may
think of thresholds as clearing the way to human
and divine encounters, to love and friendship, and to
the coming into being of a human community. In
this sense, the very structure of an inhabitable domain repeats in the building and maintenance of its
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Each would take a part of the whole and guard it as
a symbol of their enduring unity. Only an inhabited
world that is divided and reunited by walls and
thresholds can conceive of symbols, and hence of
love and friendship.

When mortals no longer recognize the divine or
when neighbors no longer partake in mutual interest, the human world regresses to an archaic, uninhabitable state, and cosmos dissolves into a physical
universe. That archaic state can be symbolized by a
house without windows or with doors forever shut.
To confine one’s life to such a place would effectively mean to surrender one’s humanity.

F

rom whatever angle we approach the house or
city, both reveal themselves invariably as a
cosmos, understood as a place where the original,
absolute separation symbolized by walls becomes
humanized through the addition of windows and
portals that grant access to neighboring realms. A
house or a city becomes inhabitable by virtue of
having joined together an inside and outside, a
heaven and Earth, a self and another.
Building a house, a city, or a temple is therefore
never solely a question of labor and technical skills.
Neither should we understand an inhabitable structure solely as a technical instrument that protects us
from the naked elements. The building of houses,
temples, and cities should first and foremost be understood as a poetic achievement that repeats the
genesis of a human world. As Mircea Eliade forcefully reminds us in Le sacré et le profane (Paris:
Gallimard, 1965), a house is not, in the provocative
phrase of Le Corbusier, “une machine à vivre” but,
on the contrary, “forms a whole that repeats the exemplary creation wrought by the gods, in the form
of a cosmogony” (p. 55).
To enter a cosmos means to enter a world that
cannot be fully encompassed by a single stance or
point of view. It can only be explored through exchanges with others. To disclose the cosmos, we
cannot remain stationary but must journey and accept a rhythm of coming and going, of entering and
leaving, of living and dying. It is this temporal order
that gives the hospitable cosmos its astonishing variety and richness.
This richness cannot be captured by violence
and becomes obscured by dreams of total possession and complete understanding. Persons and
things make their true appearance only after we
have renounced dreams of conquest and after we
become reconciled to the fact that cosmic realities
are destined to forever escape our categories and
elude our grasp. A human and divine cosmos cannot
be encompassed or controlled. It can only be embraced.

W

e have established that thresholds are symbolic limits embodying the law governing
human and divine relations. In contemplating a
house, a temple, or a city, we note that portals and
thresholds are places of vivid, personal interactions,
while walls evoke a silent world of fateful partitions
and separate destinies. Together, they create a space
of dwelling that fosters community while also according each person a separate, distinct life.
The threshold not only separates and binds human beings; it also marries a private, intimate realm
to an outside, public, workaday world. The interior
space of a home is like a harbor from which ships
sail forth in all directions and to which they return
to bring home their gathered treasures.
The threshold that both divides and joins an
“inside” and “outside” sets in motion a dynamic of
leave-taking and homecoming that inaugurates the
temporal rhythm of work and play, of an active and
contemplative life. This dynamic inside-outside interaction demonstrates that a home cannot exist
apart from the path leading from its doorsteps to the
doorsteps of another house and another realm. This
pathway interconnects not only neighbor to
neighbor but also links a familiar world with unknown surrounds. We reinforce and elaborate such a
path when we leave the intimate supportive circle of
family and friends to enter the workaday world or to
undertake voyages to foreign shores.
In short, an inhabited space, no matter whether
it forms house, city, or cosmos, links together separate and distinct worlds that thereby are transformed
into a symbolic or cosmic whole. We speak here of
a “symbolic” whole because its parts are all at once
held apart and kept together by virtue of an interconnecting threshold. The word “symbol” originally
referred to a “pledge” or “token” that usually took
the form of a coin or a piece of pottery that was
broken in pieces at the time friends had to part.
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“

there still be a need for architecture? Just what task
remains for architecture today?
Even to ask that question is to presuppose that
“architecture” is not to be equated with “building.”
To be sure, every work of architecture is also a
building, but it is more, How is this “more” to be
understood? A first answer is suggested by the traditional understanding of architecture as one of the
arts. In The Ten Books on Architecture, the first and
still most famous treatise on architecture, the Roman architect Vitruvius demanded that the architect
build “with due reference to durability, convenience, and beauty.” [1]. Ever since, thinking about
architecture has tended to take this demand pretty
much for granted.

Architecture” names, first of all, the art of
building and, second, any structure raised in
accordance with the rules of that art. Figuratively, it also refers to anything that has been
set on a firm foundation and well constructed.
Philosophers, especially, have found it useful to
invoke architectural metaphors, and no one more so
than the Frenchman Rene Descartes, who, convinced that reason was sufficient to raise a conceptual edifice that would allow human beings to understand the world and their place in it, compared
his method to that used by architects.
But if the edifice his reason raised—his “spiritual architecture,” if you will—remains a presupposition of the science and technology that have
shaped our modern world, including our built architecture, his expectation that the progress of reason
would provide human beings not only with physical
but also spiritual shelter went disappointed. The
conviction of the Enlightenment and of its heir,
Modernism, that reason would lead humanity toward an ever-brighter future, has been shattered by
the horrors of holocaust, war, terror, and environmental catastrophes.
Architecture, too, is caught up in such disenchantment. Do we still expect it to build an environment that will provide not just the body but also
the spirit with adequate shelter? How will the world
look as our children and grandchildren make their
way? No doubt, buildings will still be part of that
world: We would have to rid ourselves of our bodies
to eliminate the need for physical shelter. But will

Dreams of Beauty
Consider, for example, the way in which architectural historian Nikolaus Pevsner begins his influential An Outline of European Architecture with the
seemingly self-evident observation: “A bicycle shed
is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture.” What distinguishes works of architecture
from mere buildings, according to Pevsner, is that
they are “designed with a view to aesthetic appeal.”
In the light of that distinction, our initial question could be rephrased: What need will there be for
functional buildings that also succeed as aesthetic
objects? For many, this revised question is answered
by the very conception of the aesthetic object as that
which gives pleasure simply because it is what it is,
not because it is good for anything. Prize-winning
writer, critic, and philosopher William Gass illus-
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our commitment to objectivity to limit our understanding of what deserves to be called “real.”
Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s answer to the
question “What is the beauty of a building today?”
speaks to this threatened loss: “The same as the
beautiful face of a woman lacking spirit: something
mask-like.” His metaphor helps us better understand
his distinction between two different kinds of
beauty: When the subject is a human being, we can
more readily distinguish a beauty that is still experienced as the incarnation of spirit in matter from a
made-up, mask-like beauty—even if this latter
beauty may be more “perfect” in its presentation.
Crucial here are the different ways that beauty
relates to what is beautiful. The first beauty invites
the metaphor of a veil that conceals even as it calls
attention to what lies beneath, be it face, body, or
something sacred. Such a veil does not want to be
appreciated for its own sake but as a boundary and a
bond with what remains concealed—a threshold
both separating and linking the sacred and the profane, the inner and the outer, the spiritual and the
material. The second beauty would have us forget
what is beneath. Such superficial beauty gains special importance in a world in which all too much
invites such forgetting. This beauty offers an escape
from reality into a world of simulacra.
Returning to our example of Lincoln Cathedral,
do we capture its special aura when we understand
it as a functional building overlaid with aesthetic
intentions? The beauty of this church allowed the
building to speak of life on this Earth, of death, of
community, and of the promise of happiness—the
profound issues that mattered most to those who
built it. Into the ground of everyday buildings, the
cathedral inserted a figure of utopia. This form of
beauty provided spiritual shelter. In stark contrast,
beauty that is enjoyed only for beauty’s sake lets us
forget the burdens of our everyday existence.
Nietzsche’s remarks on the beauty of architecture appear in a section of Human, All Too Human
bearing the title: “Stone is more stone than it used to
be” [3]. But are not stones what they always were?
Of course, the earlier reference to our modern
commitment to objectivity already intimated what
has changed.

trated this point of view when he celebrated the way
one of Peter Eisenman’s houses turns its back on the
world and the everyday cares and concerns of individuals:
Thank God, I thought. This house has no concern for me and
mine, over which it has no rights, but displays in every aspect
and angle and fall of light the concern for the nature and
beauty of building that is the architect’s trust and obligation
[2].

But does such an aesthetic response provide us
with a key to the responsibility of the architect or do
justice to either beauty or architecture? Human beings have always dreamed of a more beautiful
world. The urge to decorate dwellings and tools—
indeed the human body—is as old as humanity. But
the goal was rarely to create beauty for beauty’s
sake. Across centuries and cultures, human beings
have yearned to experience the presence of spirit in
the things that surrounded them in order to feel at
home in the world. Ornament had an animating
function. When experienced as just an aesthetic addendum, decoration loses this aura.
The aura that gives a building such as England’s Lincoln Cathedral its special weight is threatened as soon as architects take their primary responsibility to be the creation of aesthetic objects. For
what is “aura”? German critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin understood the experience of aura as
an experience of spirit incarnate in matter. The observer’s identification with something, say a coconut with the look of a human face, gives it a special
aura, lets it appear as more than just mute matter.
But is this ever more than an appearance, an illusion, read into things by the observer?
Is the experience of aura then, at bottom, selfdeception? A child may experience rocks and animals as animate, endowed with the power of
speech, and fairy tales preserve traces of an older
magical experience of the aura of all things. But the
commitment to objectivity that is a presupposition
of our science and technology banishes spirit from
matter. To us moderns, things do not speak, except
perhaps as echoes of our own voice. Such echoes
leave us alone and homeless. Has what we today
call “beauty” not lost the aura beauty once possessed? Our answer depends on how much we allow

12
DOI:

12

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 20 [2009], No.

Nietzsche was thinking of Neo-Gothic churches
and Neo-Renaissance city halls, of apartment
houses given the look of Baroque palaces, of banks
built in the image of Greek temples. In the way they
appropriated past styles, such buildings did still
speak, but the original significance of the styles that
were appropriated could no longer be understood.
The architecture of the second half of the 19th
century offers ready illustrations of the mask-like
beauty Nietzsche had in mind. Functional buildings
were dressed up aesthetically with borrowed ornament, whose former spiritual significance was no
longer understood. In the first decades of the 20th
century, just about every progressive architect,
critic, or writer shared Nietzsche’s dislike of such
architecture. This sense that architecture had become a masquerade provoked many a Modernist to
demand a more honest architecture that was responsive to our modern reality and, in particular, to our
science and technology.
But have we today not returned to the “decorated sheds”—to borrow a term from the authors of
Learning from Las Vegas—of the 19th century, if in
a new key? [4]. Consider Frank Gehry’s Frederick
R. Weisman Art Museum in Minneapolis (1991-93;
photo, lower left). I would not deny this museum’s
distinctive beauty. But almost self-consciously, with
its folded façade of brushed stainless steel, this architecture brings to mind Nietzsche’s remark on the
mask-like beauty of today’s architecture, here made
conspicuous by the loose fit between glittering
cladding and a quite ordinary shed. Whenever
such a building lifts or drops its mask, the
material beneath presents itself all the more
insistently as the mute material it is, in this
case terra-cotta-colored brick and concrete.
Does the aesthetic approach not demand
of the architect attention to certain visual
qualities that help make his or her work aesthetically appealing—if not beautiful, then at
least interesting? Such concern with aesthetic
appeal, however, denies architecture the aura
that once belonged to it. As Nietzsche explains:

The contrast Nietzsche had in mind would
seem familiar to all of us and to hold not only for
architecture: Perceived meaning often veils the materiality of the things we encounter. To better understand this, consider some printed page. Matter, in
the form of ink on paper rather than stone, is meant
to communicate. And when we get caught up in
some story, we may hardly be aware of the paper or
the ink blackening our fingers. Our mind is focused
on the ideas communicated by the printed words
and our reactions to them. Here, in an obvious way,
meaning veils matter.
And do not buildings, too, have meaning in this
sense, meaning that allows us to liken them to texts?
When we enter a railroad station or a bank, what we
see is not an assemblage of stones but shapes and
surfaces that suggest the purpose or importance of
the place and invite a certain behavior. In all architecture, meaning veils the materiality of the material
of which buildings are made.
The stones of architecture thus speak to us,
though we may want to add that it is really human
beings who endow these stones with meaning as
both those who build and those who live in and with
these buildings bring to them expectations and understanding of what purposes buildings should serve
and what they should look like. In that sense, buildings cannot help but speak to us. But how then to
understand Nietzsche’s claim that “stone is more
stone today than it used to be”? In what sense had
the buildings of his day lost their ability to speak?

Originally everything on a Greek or Christian building
had a meaning, with an eye to a higher order of things:
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this aura of an inexhaustible significance surrounded the
building like a magical veil [5].

rists have long dreamed of architectural concepts
that might gather some multitude into a genuine
community. As religion proved less and less able to
offer effective spiritual shelter, such dreams gained
a new actuality: Why should some genius not be
able to create a city that would once again allow
individuals to discover their vocation as parts of a
greater whole? Presupposed is the conviction, articulated by Nietzsche, “that the human being has
value, meaning only in as much as he is a stone in a
great building” [8].
Nietzsche knew this kind of dream is likely to
strike many as a nightmare. We are too committed
to the autonomy of the individual, too preoccupied
with the self, to furnish suitable material for such an
architecture. But this does not mean that we do not
dream of it now and then. Those spiritually at sea
may well long for some architecture strong enough
to bind or crush freedom. (In the absence of Moses,
they may call for Aaron and the golden calf.)
This dream has seduced many Modern architects. Walter Gropius invited Bauhaus students to
see themselves as part of a new elite, from which
would grow a new belief, “a universally great, enduring, spiritual-religious idea,” that would find an
architectural expression worthy to take its place beside the great cathedrals. Projecting the “miracle of
the Gothic cathedrals” into the future, Gropius envisioned an architecture that once again was “the
crystalline expression of man’s noblest thoughts, his
ardour, his humanity, his faith, his religion!” [9].
We may wonder whether architects like Paul
Ludwig Troost and Albert Speer did not come closer
to realizing the dream of a new cathedral than did
the Bauhaus, although, like German philosopher
Martin Heidegger, Nazi architects preferred the
paradigms furnished by the Greek temple, transposed into a cold monumentality that reduces the
individual to insignificance. As long as nostalgia
looks to architecture to furnish human beings with
spiritual shelter, it will also feed dreams of Babel’s
tower. All dreams of the complete building are
shadowed by that tower.

Our modern approach to architecture is governed by a very different understanding of the task
of the architect: The architect is asked, among many
other requirements, to create buildings that succeed
as aesthetic objects—but the more successful the
practitioner is in this regard, the more completely
does the aesthetic object ornament and finally
smother the building itself, transforming it into a
mega-sculpture. The resultant beauty is experienced
as but a mask, leaving what lies beneath pretty
much untouched—and leaving us dreaming of a
very different kind of architecture.

Dreams of the Complete Building
That architecture has difficulty rising to the purity
found in modern painting or sculpture is evident.
Reality, with its own demands, places too many restraints on the architect. This shows itself in the disjointed appearance of countless decorated sheds.
But should great architecture not overcome that tension by embracing that reality more completely, instead of hiding it beneath some beautiful mask?
Valery’s definition of poetry as “an effort by
one man to create an artificial and ideal order of a
material of vulgar origin,” the material in this case
being ordinary language, invites application to architecture: Architecture is an effort by one individual to create an artificial and ideal order out of a
material of vulgar origin, the material now furnished by all the requirements of building [6].
Frank Lloyd Wright’s dream of an organic architecture that would make it “quite impossible to
consider the building as one thing, its furnishings
another and its setting and environment still another” points in this direction: “The very chairs and
tables, cabinets and even musical instruments,
where practicable, are of the building itself, never
fixtures upon it” [7]. Residents of such a house
would be expected to behave, perhaps even to dress
and eat in ways that would preserve the integrity of
the aesthetic whole.
Such dreams invite an aestheticization of life,
and because the physical and social environment,
too, are to be incorporated into the aesthetic whole,
an aestheticization of politics. Architects and theo-

Dreams of Freedom
Does the kind of edifying architecture represented
by Lincoln Cathedral still have a place in our mod-
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Recent manifestations of such contrarian thinking can be found in the architectural movements
known as “deconstructivism” and “anarchitecture.”
Influenced by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, the former has liked to challenge wellestablished expectations about what a work of architecture should look like by playing with fragmentation, distortion, dislocation of familiar architectural elements, and surprising geometries, where
the computer has greatly facilitated such play. By
now, such gestures have descended from elite architecture into the vernacular and become a familiar
part of everyday postmodern building practice.
The neologism “anarchitecture” suggests buildings that rise without the architect’s art. It’s not a
wholly new concept: Austrian architect Bernard
Rudofsky’s Architecture Without Architects, published in 1964, was a “frankly polemical” celebration of Old World vernacular building. But in the
work of architectural historian Robin Evans and architects Gordon Matta-Clark and Lebbeus Woods,
the word speaks with a different, more oppositional
voice: For them, anarchitecture is not a product of
anonymous builders supported by the collective
wisdom of generations in tune with the rhythms of
nature, but very much the expression of individuals
responsive to our rapidly changing cyber-world,
ever on the verge of slipping out of our control.
Anarchitecture here means cuts, ruptures, insertions, and intrusions into the body of architecture
that challenge its often all-but-overlooked rule over
our lives, inviting more thoughtful consideration of
architecture and its ruling ethos. Anarchitecture invites us to fantasize about very different environments, very different ways of life. (Gordon MattaClark, on the occasion of the 1973 dedication of the
Twin Towers, in fact, called for their erasure, unable
to even suspect that terror would all too soon realize
what was meant only as a thought-provoking comment. Of course, 9/11 has made words such as deconstruction or anarchitecture more difficult to use
and invites weightier and more difficult reflections
concerning the future of architecture.)
Anarchitecture can be seen as a recent species
of “fantastic architecture,” which has long communicated the tension between the generally accepted
function of architecture (to provide physical and

ern world? Does it not belong, as German philosopher Friedrich Hegel insisted, to a never-to-berecovered past—where Hegel would have us affirm
the death of architecture in its highest sense as part
of humanity’s coming of age, no more to be
mourned than the loss of the magic the world held
when we were children? Perhaps the only spiritual
shelter that can adequately protect us moderns is a
conceptual architecture raised by reason.
The French writer Victor Hugo suggested that
the printing press killed the cathedral. Has the car
not similarly rendered the place-establishing city
obsolete, where the car is but one manifestation of a
way of life that has brought us physical and spiritual
mobility and, thus, a freedom that by now seems an
inalienable right? How will the electronic revolution
and all it stands for transform our sense of space
and the need for architecture?
Many today dream of a post-architectural future. And with good reason: Must an ever more vigorous commitment to freedom of the individual not
make us suspicious of all place-establishing architecture? In aesthetics, the shift from the beautiful to
the sublime testifies to that change, where beauty
has long been linked to the establishment of
bounded wholes, while the sublime demands open
space. Freedom, democracy, and the promise of
open space go together. There is tension between
the call for a place-establishing architecture and the
value placed on freedom. French writer George
Bataille was not alone in suspecting a prison in
every work of architecture [10].
Similarly, this desire for freedom will rebel
again and again against the rule of reason. In his
short novel Notes from Underground, Russian
writer Fyodor Dostoevsky succinctly portrays this
seemingly deep-rooted need to oppose modern society’s reliance on the authority of reason. One of his
characters acknowledges that:
Twice-two-makes-four is, in my humble opinion, nothing but
a piece of impudence. Twice-two-makes-four is a farcical,
dressed-up fellow who stands across your path with arms
akimbo and spits at you. Mind you, I quite agree that twicetwo-makes-four is a most excellent thing; but if we are to give
everything its due, then twice-two-makes-five is sometimes a
most charming little thing, too [11].
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spiritual shelter by bounding space) and our unruly
imaginations that, moved by desire, fear, pleasure,
or disgust, give birth to fanciful apparitions, fictions, and dream visions, none of which rests on
solid ground.
Fantastic architecture belongs with utopia, this
land that lies somewhere beyond our all-toofamiliar earthbound world with its place-assigning
order. Utopia, in fact, possesses two faces: Eutopia,
that imaginary realm where reason coexists with
freedom and happiness; and dystopia, a realm where
pain drowns freedom and mocks pretentious reason.
Visions of paradise, Jerusalem, or the City of God—
realms where human beings, no longer bound by the
spirit of gravity, are finally free to fly and where
buildings will seem to float, immaterially, in boundless space—are thus shadowed by versions of the
labyrinth, Babel, or hell—dark suffocating spaces in
which lurk minotaur and devil. The seductive appeal, not just of eutopic visions but also of dystopic
ones (think of Piranesi’s Carceri) invites consideration: While it does not lead to an architecture fit for
earthbound mortals, it should make our building
more thoughtful.

The same distrust of an architecture ruled by an
all-too-human reason let the painter Friedensreich
Hundertwasser call “the air raids of 1943 a perfect
automatic lesson in form; straight lines and their
vacuous structures ought to have been blown to
pieces, and so they were.” He admonishes us to
“strive, as rapidly as possible for total uninhabitability and creative mouldering in architecture” [12]. In
this connection, the decision by architects of the
18th century to actually build ruins deserves consideration, as does the related decision by Romantic
painters to represent still-intact buildings as ruins.
Related is the dream of buildings in the image
of the architecture of animals. Juhani Pallasmaa has
suggested that what makes their architecture so
beautiful “is its total integration into the life pattern
of its builder and to the dynamically balanced system of nature” [14]. Its beauty figures what is denied to us: a dwelling completely at home in nature,
in tune with its rhythms.
Today, such dreams have gained weight and
been given a special urgency by ever-more-pressing
environmental concerns. Green architecture has become much more than just a slogan: It is demanded
by a still expanding humanity on a collision course
with finite natural resources.
How should environmental problems, of which
the energy crisis is only the most visible manifestation, affect the look of the built environment? How
will they transform our still prodigal use of space?
Will there be gardens on the roof of every building?
Everyone who builds, no matter how modest the
work, bears responsibility for how those who come
after have to live with it. To meet that responsibility,
architects must be able to meet the challenges presented by the environment and by the needs of stillunborn generations.
Common sense tells us that, in light of these
environmental pressures, much of what we call development today is in fact irresponsible. Not just
this country but the entire world remains caught
up—despite numerous warnings, prophecies of
doom, and modest efforts to remedy the effects of
waste and pollution—in a process that, if not
checked by a changed attitude to this Earth, will
lead to disaster or, rather, disasters.

Dreams of Nature
Suspicion of architecture has attended thinking
about architecture from the very beginning: In paradise, there was no need for building; in this garden,
Adam and Eve were at home. And might artifice not
recover what pride is supposed to have lost? Both
English philosopher Francis Bacon and Descartes
thus dreamed of paradise regained on the basis of
science and technology.
We are not done with that dream. Our architecture shows that the Cartesian promise that reason
will render us the masters and possessors of nature
was not idle. But the history of the 20th century
demonstrates that the possession of such power has
not brought us wisdom. The shadow of Babel’s
tower, which today so easily blurs with the shadow
cast by fascist architecture, darkens many a Modernist dream of architecture and invites very different thoughts. Was it not Cain who built the first
city? Convinced that our true home is not to be established by human artifice, painters thus liked to
place the Nativity in some fantastic ruin.
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scales.” So he called on architecture schools to encourage students:

The list is long and sobering: a deteriorating
environment that will make clean water, air, and
soil—not to mention relatively unspoiled nature—a
thing of the past; wars over dwindling resources;
mass starvation; and moral disintegration that could
lead to the self-destruction of humanity itself. To
ensure a livable environment for future generations,
we must learn to consider physical space a scarce
resource; to develop different, much denser settlement patterns; and to imagine a less oppositional
relationship between architecture and nature.
Such efforts, however, are unlikely to be successful without a change of heart. If shortsighted,
selfish interests are allowed to continue to shape the
built environment, we can only expect its further
deterioration. Also needed is what German poet and
philosopher Friedrich Schiller called an aesthetic
education. Decisions to give a high-rise the look of
a turning torso, as Santiago Calatrava did in Malmö,
or an apartment building the look of a dancing couple, as Frank Gehry did in Prague, may lead to interesting aesthetic objects but make no contribution
to such an awareness.
Needed is architecture that transforms our understanding of how we should live. A high standard
of living measured by per capita income does not
necessarily mean a high quality of life. What kind
of life do we want for our children and our children’s children? A greener architecture is needed,
not just to address ever-more unavoidable environmental problems but, more fundamentally, to help
bring about a change of heart.

to experiment with the building of all sorts of space, in all
sorts of ways, with all sorts of material. They should have
periods in which they do not care that their work may not interest a client or that no one may ever build it or that it may
not fit in with prevailing styles. Not until they take seriously
the need to explore the possibilities of bounding spaces in
multiple ways will they become alert to architecture as an art,
as respectable, revelatory, creative, and at least as difficult as
any other [6].

But while such thinking has led to the creation
of countless striking aesthetic objects, their often
undeniable beauty resists inhabitation and contributes little to the creation of a successful built environment. Like all aesthetic objects, such works invite admiration simply for what they are. If we demand that architecture provide both physical and
spiritual shelter, the creation of such aesthetic objects fails to meet the architect’s special responsibility. Instead of shelter, it offers distractions. A different kind of beauty is needed.
Benjamin’s understanding of aura intimates
such a beauty. Why does aura matter? An answer is
suggested when Benjamin links the experience of
aura to the experience of a person as a person:
Looking at someone carries the implicit expectation that our
look will be returned by the object of our gaze. Where this
expectation is met (which, in the case of thought processes,
can apply equally to the look of the mind and to a glance pure
and simple), there is an experience of the aura to the fullest
extent [17].

To experience the distinctive aura of the other
is to experience an incarnation of spirit in matter so
complete that there is no distance between the two.
Although Benjamin is describing an interaction between two people, something of the sort is present
in every experience of aura.
Benjamin claimed that works of art have to lose
their aura in the age of mechanical reproduction.
Does this not also hold for works of architecture?
Jean Nouvel points to what awaits us:

The Architect’s Responsibility
William Gass called “concern for the nature and
beauty of building” the architect’s “trust and obligation.” Much depends here on how the nature of
building and its beauty are understood.
In the late 1950s the philosopher Paul Weiss,
writing very much in the orbit of aesthetic Modernism, defined architecture as “the art of creating
space through the construction of boundaries in
common-sense space” [15]. Like William Gass, he
thought it important that the architect’s creativity
not be fettered by “judges, critics, clients, and problems relating to engineering, city planning, and

From the moment an office building is made on the basis of an
existing typology, whose technology and price and the conditions for its realization are known, we can duplicate the building and have it constructed without paying for a new design”
[18].
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damental distinction between the aura of human beings, works of art, and natural objects?
The threat that reproduction poses to our experience of the aura of things is also a threat to our
own human essence. This makes it important to
open windows in the conceptual architecture raised
by reason, windows to dimensions of reality that
resist comprehension and therefore cannot be reproduced. A successful work of art should have something of the enigmatic presence we experience in
the face of a person. That, it seems to me, is a test
that architecture, too, must meet if it is to continue
to provide us with spiritual shelter. At stake is nothing less than our humanity.

In the same conversation, French social theorist
Jean Baudrillard said this about the then stillstanding Twin Towers: “These two towers resemble
two perforated bands. Today we’d probably say
they’re clones of each other, that they’ve already
been cloned” [19]. To experience a work of architecture as a simulacrum is to experience it as unbearably light. (This observation of their design, of
course, does not in any way take away from the unbearable weight we feel for the destruction of these
towers and the subsequent loss of so many lives.)
In this age of the computer, the very concept of
aura may seem to betray nostalgia for something
that lies irrecoverably behind us. But without some
experience of aura, we feel alone and homeless.
That is what makes the increasing loss of aura in the
age of technical reproduction so frightening: Are
not even human beings today in danger of losing
that special aura that distinguishes persons from
their simulacra? What in principle distinguishes a
person from a robot with a computer brain? The
loss of an experience of aura threatens the loss of
our humanity.
That threat is recognized by Baudrillard when,
in his discussion with Nouvel, he takes the task of
art today to be that of tearing away the masks that
aesthetics and culture have placed over our suffocating artificial world, where the virtual threatens to
displace the real. Art, he insists, should preserve the
“enigmatic side” of things, should break open modern culture, which today is
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everywhere... a homologue of industry and technology... A
work of art is a singularity, and all these singularities can create holes, interstices, voids… in the metastatic fullness of culture [20].

Why such emphasis on singularity? At issue is
the distinction between what artifice can produce
and what is given. Whatever artifice can produce
can, in principle, be reproduced. But the simplest
thing, say a rock or a leaf, is infinitely complex, a
unique given that resists full comprehension and
therefore reproduction.
What is at issue is related to the question: Why
does aura matter? What allows us in this age of the
technical reproducibility, not just of works of art,
but increasingly of everything, to hold on to a fun-
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O

nomenon undoubtedly connected both with the
character of Tasmania as an island as well as the
darkness of much of its history).

ne of my favorite descriptions of sense
of place is poet Seamus Heaney’s discussion of English romantic poet William
Wordsworth. Referring to the Westmoreland landscape that figures in Wordsworth’s poem
“Michael,” Heaney writes that the landscape is both
“humanized and humanizing” [1]. The landscape or,
more generally, the place, is thus seen as itself having a human character, while it also makes human
those who live within it.
The mutuality between place and human suggested by Heaney has been a fundamental theme in
much of my work, and, if we take it that such mutuality is a real feature of the relation between places
and persons, it goes a long way in explaining why it
is that place and the sense of place take on so much
importance in human life and experience.
Of course, we don’t need to turn only to poets
to know the importance of place in our lives. As a
philosopher who frequently talks to both academic
and popular audiences about place and the sense of
place, I am struck by how readily ideas of place
strike a chord in just about everybody. We all have
our own stories about the places that matter to us,
and about the ways in which our lives have been
affected, and even shaped, by the places in which
we live.
In Tasmania, where I now live and work, this is
particularly evident, and the island seems somehow
imbued with a stronger or more self-evident sense
of place than anywhere else I have been (a phe-

Putting Place in Question
Although it seems an obvious, though not uncontestable, fact that place is important and appears
easily recognizable as a key element in our lives, it
remains a question as to why this should be so. Is
our connection to place merely a contingent—an
accidental feature of human life and experience? Is
our connection to place merely a residue of the way
human beings used to live—tied to a particular
town, village or locality, and often having little or
no experience of the world outside a certain narrow
region?
Perhaps in the globalized contemporary world,
in which air travel brings everywhere to within little
more than a day’s journey, and in which the electronic media can connect us with just about anywhere, the idea that we have a special connection to
place will come to seem rather old-fashioned, and
the very notion of a special sense of place merely
another form of nostalgia for a past that is no longer
relevant or real.
If our connection to place is indeed merely contingent and so can change as the circumstances of
human life change, then much of the discussion of
place and sense of place may well have to be
viewed as of only passing interest and as really a
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discussion that belongs to the past rather than to the
present or to the future.
This possibility is a significant challenge in itself. Those of us who think that place matters, even
in the era of globalization and commodification,
must be able to provide an account of the nature and
significance of place that is grounded in more than
just our own individual experiences or responses, no
matter how widely they may be shared. What is
needed is an account that gives insight into the necessary character of place itself and that allows the
connection to place to be seen as a necessary part of
what it is to be human.
In the absence of such an account, it will always be possible that the significance of place may
be open to question. And more than that, in the absence of such an account, we cannot be certain
whether our positive evaluation of place and of the
sense of place is itself legitimate, or whether it may
even be misleading or dangerous.
Certainly, there are many contemporary theorists who would argue that, if the advent of globalization does imply a loss of any real sense of place,
then this is no bad thing and that the sooner we can
discard the idea of a special connection to place, the
better. In fact, for some, the idea that place has a
special importance in human life, and that particular
places have a special role in making us what we are,
is itself one of the most dangerous and pernicious
ideas in the whole of human history [2].

conflict in which notions of land and identity play a
crucial role; in Nazi Germany, the event that is the
great horror of the 20th century—the Jewish Holocaust—was enacted on the basis of an ideology of
“blood and soil” and the pre-eminence of the German “homeland.”
Even in Australia, we have seen recent attempts
to defend particular areas by violent means against
those who come from “outside,” the most striking
example being the Cronulla beach riots of December 2005 [3]. The idea of a sense of place, some
might say, is thus not just the vestige of a past we
have outgrown but is also the root cause of inhumanity, conflict, violence and much suffering.
Occasionally, one finds that this claim is reinforced, not merely by reference to examples, but
also by a set of conceptual considerations that, in
general form, run as follows:

1.

Consider what is implied by the idea of a special sense of place. For many people it means
that the place “speaks” to them, that it has a significance for them, and usually this means that the
place plays a role in either reflecting something of
their own sense of themselves or else that it actually
shapes or is a part of that sense of self. Thus, when
we say that we feel we belong to a place, we really
mean that the place is part of who and what we are.

2.

Think of what it might mean for this sort of
special relationship between place and self to
hold. If the relationship is one that plays a role in
shaping my sense of self or in determining who and
what I am, then one might suppose that the relationship must be one that is somehow peculiar to me or
to people who share a similar sense of identity and
self—otherwise the relationship would not have any
special sense for me, nor could it serve to shape my
identity, as distinct from that of others.

The Danger of Place?
The argument for the inherent danger of place often
proceeds by historical example: There are countless
instances in which the idea that some individual or
group has a special connection to some particular
place, whether village, town or region, is the basis
for acts of violence and exclusion, of varying degrees, against those who are seen as not of that
place—as “other.”
The examples are easy to cite: In the Middle
East, the conflict between Israeli and Palestinian is
centered around the claim that each makes to the
same “homeland” and in which the city of Jerusalem is the central focus for intractable disagreement
and division; in the Balkans, the conflict in Kosovo
is only the most recent example of a long history of

3.

Yet if the relation between my self and the
places that are important to me is a relationship that serves to shape my identity and so to give
me a sense of self that distinguishes me from others
(or at least from some others—from those, let’s say,
who are not part of my community), then it must
also serve to shape my sense of who is other just as
much as it shapes my sense of who is not other.
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Indigenous Notions of Place

Now sometimes the reasoning seems to stop at
this point, as if it were enough to demonstrate the
dangerous nature of place simply by demonstrating
the way in which place can be seen to underpin the
opposition of self and other, friend and stranger,
compatriot and foreigner. Yet, clearly, this is not
enough to substantiate the claim that the sense of
place is itself a dangerous or pernicious notion. Our
connection to place may be part of what makes for
the possibility of identity and so also of difference,
but neither the fact of identity nor difference need
be problematic in themselves. Something more
must be added here [4].

This question can be seen as returning us to the
challenge that I referred to near the beginning of
this discussion: Since the claim in question concerns the necessarily exclusionary character of
place, that claim can only be substantiated or refuted by looking to an account of the nature of place
and our connection to it that is based, not in the contingent or the individual, but in the necessary structure of place as such. Yet before we take up this
matter in more detail, it is worth considering one
way in which the idea of our connection to place is
expressed that seems to stand as a direct counter to
the idea that such connection is always authoritarian
and controlling.
The idea of an intimate connection between
place and human being is a widespread, if not universal, feature of Indigenous life and culture. This
idea was given popular expression in Bruce Chatwin’s The Songlines (London: Penguin, 1987),
which focused on the importance of place in “nomadic” cultures, both the cultures of Aboriginal
Australia and of the North African Bedouin, but it
has also been the focus for many other works, both
popular and scholarly, and it is an idea that is often
taken as marking off Indigenous modes of life from
the non-Indigenous.
Significantly, those who would argue for the
dangerous and pernicious character of place seldom
direct their critique at Indigenous conceptions. One
might view this as purely a consequence of political
sensitivity, but given the argument I set out above,
there may be a more fundamental reason for this.
Indigenous conceptions of place assert an essential belonging of human beings to the places they
inhabit. In Aboriginal Australian culture, for instance, one’s very identity, one’s totemic and kinship relations, are inseparable from one’s country
and the landmarks—the rocks, trees, waterholes,
and so on—that make it up.
Yet leaving aside the complications introduced
by European notions of land ownership, there is no
sense of this belonging to place in an Indigenous
context that entails proprietorship or authority over
the places to which one belongs. There may well be
a sense of the importance of protecting and preserving those places—a sense, one might say, of guardi-

4.

What seems to provide the necessary additional consideration, although it is seldom
made explicit, is the idea that maintaining a sense of
identity through connection to place necessarily implies the violent exclusion of others from that place.
In essence, so this idea seems to run, my belonging
to place must always be based in the belonging of
that place to me and only to me (or to my community). Place and the sense of place is thus seen to be
dangerous and pernicious because the relationship
to place is always a relationship of ownership, even
if often of disguised ownership.
If place is as dangerous as sometimes claimed,
then it must be because violence and exclusion are
part of the very idea of place—are already implied
in the very notion of a connection to place. But this
would seem to be so only if our belonging to place
is indeed understood to mean the belonging of place
to us. And certainly it is hard to see how one could
advance the line of reasoning that concludes in such
a negative valuation of place without relying on this
idea.
Moreover, when we turn to the examples that
are so often cited to support the claims of the negativity of place, we find that what characterizes those
examples is precisely a tendency to assert sovereignty, authority, or control over the places to which
belonging is claimed. The question that now
emerges is this: Is it really the case that the assertion
of our connection to place is merely another way of
asserting control over place?
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character (philosophy being understood as the mode
of inquiry that looks to uncover the fundamental
nature and significance of things). As such, the account is grounded in a detailed analysis of the underlying character of human being as well as the
character of place. Significantly, it is also an account that mirrors key features of Indigenous conceptions of place.
Indigenous accounts of place emphasize the
way in which place is formed and sustained through
journey and movement, pathway and track. Not
only does this suggest that our relationship with
place is always one of active engagement with place
and with that which is found within it, but it also
means that place has to be understood as itself a dynamic and relational structure in which we are already embedded, rather than some static object over
which “ownership” can simply be asserted.
I have tried to capture this idea through an
analogy with old-fashioned methods of topographical surveying in which one comes to understand a
landscape or stretch of country, not through mere
observation from a distance, but rather through
one’s engagement with that landscape as one undertakes repeated triangulations between landmarks,
measuring distance and angle, as one traverses the
distance from one landmark to another. The place
that is the entire landscape is thus grasped as made
up of a network of places, joined by the paths between, while those places are themselves made what
they are through the way they are located in relation
to each other within that larger landscape.
On this account, then, place has to be understood as essentially relational in character, and our
own connection to place—our “sense of place” —is
seen as emerging through our active engagement
with that place and our embeddedness in the relations that make it up. Both these features clearly
connect with features evident in Indigenous accounts of place.
Here we have the beginnings of a way of making sense of the underlying nature and significance
of place that can help us to see why the connection
to place is not merely a contingent or outmoded feature of human being. But just as this account mirrors key elements of Indigenous understandings of
place, so we can also see why our connection to

anship—but this need not entail, except in the case
of some ritual places, the complete exclusion of
others.
Moreover, for many Indigenous cultures, including that of Aboriginal Australia, the relationship
to place is established and sustained, not through
the exercise of authority over the place—through
ensuring one’s own exclusive access to it—but
rather through journeying across it and through the
stories that such journeying embodies and expresses. The relation between place and human being is thus explicitly seen to be one in which human
beings are indeed shaped by place and, while human beings may have a responsibility to respect and
care for place, and so there is indeed a measure of
mutuality here, it is human beings who stand under
the authority of place, rather than the other way
around.

Place “Topographically”
Although, as I noted above, the intimacy of the
connection to place within many Indigenous cultures is sometimes taken to be part of what marks
off the Indigenous from the non-Indigenous, I take
the Indigenous understanding of the human connection to place to provide important insights into the
real nature and significance of place for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. The sense of
place that I referred to at the start of this discussion—the sense of place that Heaney describes in
terms of the landscape as “humanized and humanizing”—is a sense that I would argue should be understood much more on the model of Indigenous
modes of thought than by assimilation to any disguised form of ownership or control.
Indeed, the whole point of Heaney’s emphasis
on the importance of the sense of place is precisely
to direct attention to the mutuality of the relation
between place and human being—that while we
may affect the places in which we live and so may
take responsibility for them, those places also affect
us in profound and inescapable ways.
Much of my work on place has aimed at meeting the challenge of providing an account of our
connection to place that understands it as more than
just an accidental feature of human psychology. In
other words, my approach has been philosophical in
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to “own up” to the complexity and mutuality of
both place and human being.

place cannot be construed on the model of our ownership of, or authority over, place.
Place has an essentially relational structure, and
our connection to place is such that we are always
already embedded within that structure. As a result,
place cannot be grasped as some possession over
which we can take hold. Moreover, while our connection to place operates through our engagement
with and movement through place—and in so doing
we allow the character of places to appear—we are
ourselves inevitably shaped by those places, and so
stand under their sway.
We are, one might say, “owned” by place in a
way that is quite different from any ownership we
might attempt to exercise over particular places. Yet
there is a mutuality here that is captured in
Heaney’s description of the Wordsworthian landscape as “humanized and “humanizing.” It is
through our engagement with place that our own
human being is made real, but it is also through our
engagement that place takes on a sense and a significance of its own.
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within an Australian context, many would view the immigration and border protection policies of the Howard Government
(which can themselves be seen as part of the larger context
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who supposedly do not “belong.”
4. One might suggest, of course, that there is already a
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place as such, since if there were such a propensity, this would
mean that the conflict and suffering that is sometimes associated with claims to place is a consequence of a quite general
feature of human psychology—it would not be a feature of the
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“Owning up” to Place
There is no doubt that we can and do make claims
of ownership with respect to places, regions, and so
forth. But this assertion of ownership operates at a
very different level from that of our proper belonging to place. Just as Indigenous conceptions of belonging may co-exist (if not always comfortably)
with non-Indigenous notions of ownership so, too,
may the idea of a human connection to place coexist with ideas of proprietorship and sovereignty.
The mistake is to conflate these two very different notions. It is precisely their conflation and
not the idea of place as such that underpins the violent and exclusionary responses to place that we see
exemplified in the Middle East, in Kosovo, in Nazi
Germany, and even in contemporary Australia.
When we fail to understand the real nature of
our connection to place and refuse to understand
that connection other than in terms of ownership
and control, then not only have we misunderstood
ourselves, but we have also lost any real sense of
place as such. To have a sense of place is not to own
but rather to be owned by the places we inhabit; it is

From Malpas’ Place and Experience (1999)
In [recent] discussion, place… has been viewed with a great
deal of suspicion as a romantic affectation or as arising out of
some sedentary conservatism. But, if the arguments of the preceding pages are taken seriously, then place can neither be
dismissed in this way nor can it be unproblematically taken to
give support to any particular form of conservatism.
The complex structure of place, its resistance to any simple
categorization or characterization, its encompassing of both
subjective and objective elements, its necessary interconnections with agency, all suggest that the idea of place does not so
much bring a certain politics with it, as define the very frame
within which the political itself must be located. It is only from
out of a grasp of place within which the political can arise that
we can even begin to think about the possibility of a politics
that would do justice to our existence as fundamentally an existence in and through place (p. 198).
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T

he flexibility of the word “place” allows it
to encompass a rich range of possibilities.
It can refer to social context but more
generally implies something about somewhere. No definition is needed to understand what it
means when we say, for instance, “Save a place for
me” or “Victoria—the place to be” (as license plates
claim), or even when it is suggested by philosopher
Thomas Nagel that “the world is a big, complex
place” [1].
On the other hand, this range of uses suggests
that a place can be pretty much whatever we want it
to be. I agree with John Cameron that “the breadth
of the notion of place… is both a strength and a
weakness” and that ways have to be found to avoid
its being so inclusive that it means all things to all
people [2].
In this essay, I argue that a pragmatic sense of
place must be an essential component in the development of effective ways to cope with 21st-century
environmental and social challenges. If place can
mean whatever we want, this argument would be a
vacuous exercise, so I will begin with some clarifications and restrictions.

ties, by the stories and shared memories connected
to it, and by the intensity of meanings people give
to or derive from it.
The parts of the world without names are undifferentiated space, and the absence of a name is
equivalent to the absence of place. Conversely,
where communities have deep roots, it seems that
their named places fuse culture and environment,
and this fusion is then revealed in striking cultural
landscapes. There is a scale implication here because, when the term “place” is used geographically
(as in the expression, “The place where I live
is…”), the reference usually seems to be to somewhere about the size of a landscape that can potentially be seen in a single view—for example, a village, small town, or urban neighborhood.
This sense of focus is, I think, a core notion of
place corresponding closely with ideas of community and locality. I stress, however, that, since in ordinary language a place can be at any scale from the
world down to a chair, large places must be loosely
comprised of smaller ones, and smaller places are
nested within larger ones [4]. In other words, while
place may be spatially focused at the scale of a
landscape, it is not spatially constrained.
The antithesis of place is placelessness, a sort
of non-place quality manifest in uniformity, standardization and disconnection from context. If a
place is somewhere, placelessness can be anywhere
[5]. It is tempting to see place and placelessness as
opposite types of landscape—to contrast, for instance, the distinctiveness of a small town on the
Costa Brava with a placeless industrial suburb of

Place & Placelessness
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz suggests that culture
consists of webs of significance woven by human
beings, in which we are all suspended [3]. Places
occur where these webs touch the earth and connect
people to the world. Each place is a territory of significance, distinguished from larger or smaller areas
by its name, by its particular environmental quali-
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ence and actions. Though elements of a belief in
sacred spirits of place persist—for example, in
geomancy and feng shui—spirit of place now generally refers to a mostly secular quality, either natural or built, that gives somewhere a distinctive identity.
In this “profane” meaning, spirit of place is understood as an inherent quality, though subject to
change. When a settlement is abandoned, as has
happened with many Canadian prairie towns, buildings collapse and spirit of place fades. Alternatively,
as somewhere is built up and lived in, spirit of place
grows. In this way, even an initially placeless suburb gradually acquires its own identity, at least for
many who live there.
Sometimes “sense of place” is used to refer to
what might more accurately be called “spirit of
place”—the unique environmental ambience and
character of a landscape or place. I prefer to keep a
distinction between sense of place and spirit of
place, though clearly they are closely connected.
As I understand it, sense of place is the faculty
by which we grasp spirit of place and that allows us
to appreciate differences and similarities among
places. Spirit of place exists primarily outside us
(but is experienced through memory and intention),
while sense of place lies primarily inside us (but is
aroused by the landscapes we encounter). From a
practical perspective, this lived difference means
that, while it is possible to design environments that
enhance or diminish spirit of place, it is no more
possible to design my sense of place than it is to
design my memory.
Sense of place is a synaesthetic faculty that
combines sight, hearing, smell, movement, touch,
imagination, purpose, and anticipation. It is both an
individual and intersubjective attribute, closely connected to community as well as to personal memory
and self. It is variable. Some people are not much
interested in the world around them, and place for
them is mostly a lived background. But others always attend closely to the character of the places
they encounter.

Toronto—and to assume that place is good and
placelessness is somehow deficient.
But this oppositional thinking is simplistic.
Rather, place and placelessness are bound together
in a sort of geographical embrace so that almost
everywhere contains aspects of both. Place is an
expression of what is specific and local, while
placelessness corresponds to what is general and
mass-produced. Thus, even the standardized uniformity of placelessness always has some unique
characteristic, such as the arrangement of buildings.
And no matter how distinctively different
somewhere may appear, it always shares some of its
features with other places—for example, red tile
roofs and white walls are a common feature of
Mediterranean towns. These sorts of similarities
make exceptional qualities and meanings comprehensible to outsiders.
In a world of unique places, travel would be
enormously difficult because nothing would be familiar; in a perfectly placeless world, travel would
be pointless. It is helpful, therefore, to think of place
and placelessness arranged along a continuum and
existing in a state of tension. At one extreme, distinctiveness is ascendant and sameness diminished;
at the other extreme, uniformity dominates and distinctiveness is suppressed. Between these extremes
there are countless possible configurations. Theoretically, at the midpoint they are equal, but in actual landscapes such a balance is probably impossible to identify [6].
In short, things are rarely straightforward. For
instance, distinctive identities can be borrowed, plagiarized, or contrived. At least two towns in the
North American Rockies have reinvented themselves as Bavarian communities, and there are gondolas in Las Vegas and on Lake Ontario. This geographical borrowing of strong place identities is not
uncommon, and where it occurs the qualities of
place distinctiveness have been made placeless.

Spirit & Sense of Place
“Spirit of place” is a translation of the Latin genius
loci. The Romans believed in a pantheon of gods,
many associated with specific places. Each house,
town, grove, and mountain was possessed by its
own spirit that gave identity to that place by pres-

Exclusion & Extensibility
A strong sense of place appears to be partly instinctive but can also be learned and enhanced through
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visit hundreds of places and meet thousands of people in a lifetime. The geographer Paul Adams uses
the term “extensibility” to depict the unexceptional
fact that lives now extend easily among many
places across scales from the local to global [10].
Modern networks of communication allow and even
require that we continually situate ourselves in
wider contexts and make comparisons with distant
places, many of which we may have visited or at
least seen on television.
In short, sense of place today is far more diffuse and distributed than even two generations ago.
As a result, sense of place must, in some ways, be
shallower. I simply have not spent long enough living in one place to develop the deep associations
that, for my grandfather, must have been taken for
granted. I do not mean to suggest that the current
extended sense of place is weak or deficient—only
that it differs from pre-modern, rooted experiences.
Indeed, some familiarity with different places
facilitates an appreciation of the lives of others and
provides an antidote for a poisoned, exclusionary
sense of place. Familiarity with other places is also
essential for grasping the connections between
global processes and challenges and their manifestations in particular places.

the careful practice of comparative observation and
appreciation for what makes places distinctive [7].
The deepest sense of place seems to be associated
with being at home, being somewhere you know
and are known by others, where you are familiar
with the landscape and daily routines and feel responsible for how well your place works.
There are two crucial qualifications regarding
responsibility for place. First, while it is mostly a
positive attitude that contributes to social and environmental responsibility, sense of place can turn
sour or be poisoned when it becomes parochial and
exclusionary. NIMBY-ism and gated communities
are familiar examples of negative place attitudes,
but far more serious is ethnic cleansing [8]. This
exclusionary tendency is always latent in sense of
place. It can, however, be deliberately countered
through the self-conscious development of a cosmopolitan perspective that grasps similarities and
respects differences among places.
Second, sense of place varies over time. Thomas Homer-Dixon notes that, until about 1800,
most people lived in rural areas, met, in their lifetimes, only a few hundred people, communicated by
speech and walking, and rarely traveled more than a
few miles from their birthplace [9]. A century later,
this situation still applied to my grandfather, who
lived most of his life in a village in South Wales
where he ran a small construction firm and built the
house in which he died 30 years later. Such a geographically-focused life must have led to profound
place associations, where each person, house, field,
road, and custom was familiar and known by name.
In some remote areas and in nostalgic beliefs, this
intimate familiarity lingers into the present, but it is
mostly a pre-modern experience.
In dramatic contrast, our sense of place at the
start of the 21st century is spread-eagled across the
world. My daily 25-kilometer commute to work in
Toronto is farther than probably most residents in
my grandfather’s village traveled in their lifetimes.
Conferences on the other side of the world, vacations in distant places, emails to colleagues on other
continents—all are commonplace.
In less than a century, both direct and vicarious
place experiences have been enormously expanded.
For large numbers of people today, it is normal to

Emerging Challenges

The 20th century began with optimistic expectations
that social and environmental problems caused by
industrialization would be corrected through technological innovation and political reform. There
were remarkable improvements in productivity and
standards of living, but there were also genocidal
wars, technologies of annihilation, irresponsible environmental damage, and a remarkable failure to
reduce global poverty. It is scarcely surprising,
therefore, that the 21st century began pessimistically
with numerous expressions of concern that our civilization is generating insoluble problems usually
characterized as global because they are widespread. What strikes me, however, is that their consequences will manifest locally, synergistically, and
probably unpleasantly in the diverse places of everyday life. Attempts to deal with these consequences
will need to be at least partially grounded in a carefully articulated sense of place.
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pated that oil and gas supplies will peak globally in
the next few years and decline thereafter, precisely
as Chinese and Indian economic growth drives demand rapidly upward. Energy costs will rise dramatically, and the spatially distributed ways of
modern life will be seriously compromised. In the
reduced energy economy of the future, it is inevitable that, for most people, high energy and travel
costs will motivate an everyday life much more locally focused than currently.

In her Dark Age Ahead, Jane Jacobs suggests
that “we are rushing headlong into a dark age.”
Among other causes, she blames the decline of scientific objectivity, systems of taxation remote from
local problems, and demise of community [11].
Martin Rees, the Astronomer Royal, discusses the
challenges posed by climate change, terrorism, and
possible technological error. He gives our civilization no more than a fifty percent chance of surviving to the end of the century [12].
Yet again, Thomas Homer-Dixon speculates
that the problems we have created might exceed our
capacity to solve them [13], while Howard Kunstler
argues that we are sleepwalking into a future of
converging and mutually amplifying catastrophes
[15]. It is possible, of course, that such pessimistic
predictions will amount to nothing. Critics highlight
previous dire predictions that turned out to be
wrong. This time, however, there are many interconnected, large-scale challenges arising simultaneously. The key message of commentators like Jacobs and Rees is that our responsibility to coming
generations requires that we take action now.
The consequences of these challenges are uncertain, but even brief reflection suggests they will
be locally varied and will, at least in part, require
place-based strategies for their mitigation. For example, climate change is global but its consequences will be as locally varied as the weather. As
droughts, floods, and hurricanes intensify and become more commonplace, one realizes that the infrastructure of both agriculture and cities—water
supply, storm drains, flood walls, and so forth—has
been designed for the weather of the past and is rapidly becoming obsolete. This shift suggests that,
regardless of the causes of climate change, substantial modifications to existing farms and cities will
be needed to keep them productive and habitable. If
they are to be effective, these modifications must be
founded in the specifics of places, since the changes
in weather patterns and environmental risks are regional or local [16]. Adaptations to protect New Orleans against more intense hurricanes have little
relevance for dealing with longer droughts in Sydney or Melbourne.
The challenges of climate change will be exacerbated by rising costs of energy. It is widely antici-

Living with Differences Locally
Since the early1970s, a demographic imbalance has
developed with rapid population growth in the
Third World and stagnation or decline in the First
World. The economic disparities associated with
this imbalance have been contributing factors to
major migrations from developing to developed nations. One result has been the emergence of what
Leonie Sandercock calls “mongrel cities”—cities
with racially and culturally mixed populations.
Sandercock argues that a major challenge for
st
21 -century urban planning is to find ways “for
stroppy strangers to live together without too much
violence”—in other words, to find ways to deal
with ethnic conflicts and the politics of difference
[16]. Sense of place is very much at stake here because of the extensibility of immigrants’ experience
back to their home countries and because immigrants must establish connections with places originally built by cultures often vastly different from
their own. One likely result will be tensions among
different cultural groups.
The solutions to these tensions, Sandercock
claims, will need to be worked out at the local level
so that different groups can find ways to express
their identities in neighborhoods that are neither
ghettos nor zones of exclusion. For this, she suggests, there is no appropriate general theory. Instead, the need is a continuous process of place
making that is curious about spirit of place, learns
from local knowledge, and respects diversity.

Global & Local Together
International migrations are one component of
globalization—the integration of the world into a
single economic system connected by supply chains
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and flows of people, capital, and information. These
global flows are controlled and monitored through a
network of some 100 “world cities” such as Tokyo,
London, New York, Sydney, and Singapore [17].
World cities are characterized by hub airports, stock
exchanges, corporate headquarters, international
institutions, and facilities for media production.
In many ways, these world cities are infused
with placelessness in that they are oriented more to
the global marketplace than to their region or nation. But these global cities also incorporate a local
aspect. While transnational offices and manufacturing facilities can bring jobs, kudos, and economic
prosperity, they can also be abruptly relocated to
other world locations where labor costs are lower or
circumstances more profitable. When this happens,
local communities suffer as jobs move away, people
lose income, and inequities intensify [18].
Municipalities everywhere, but especially
world cities, must find ways to protect themselves
against such sudden shifts in the global economy
over which they have little or no control. Even
Thomas Friedman, a journalist with an unalloyed
enthusiasm for globalization, suggests that such
shifts pose a major challenge for finding a healthy
balance between preserving a sense of local identity,
home, and community, yet doing what is necessary
to survive in a global economic system [20]. In
other words, the need is a clear sense of place that
also acknowledges the spatially-extended character
of the economic systems underpinning our lives.
Climate change, the end of cheap energy, globalization, ethnic tensions in mongrel cities, and
other complex challenges have arisen as pressing
issues only in the last 25 years. The impacts of these
challenges have a global reach, but their individual
and combined consequences will be very different
in quartiers of Paris, villages of Somalia, suburbs of
Las Vegas, exurbs of London, skyscrapers of
Shanghai, or favelas of São Paulo.
Mitigation strategies will need to be founded in
the particularities of places because there the consequences will be most acute. But there is another,
more philosophical, reason why place will be central to future planning strategies: There has been a
deep epistemological shift away from the rationalistic assumptions of modernism—assumptions that

promoted universal, placeless solutions to environmental and social problems—to an acknowledgement of the significance of diversity.
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Deep Epistemological Change
Sandercock celebrates the demise of scientific objectivity because she sees it as a repressive instrument of powerful groups with vested interests [20].
In contrast, Jane Jacobs considers its demise to be
one cause of a potential dark age [21]. What both
thinkers agree on is that scientific objectivity is in
retreat, a view supported by many philosophers of
science. Stephen Toulmin, for example, notes that
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early 20th-century scholars shared a confidence in
scientific method but then declares: “How little of
that confidence remains today” [22]. In 1989, Thomas Nagel suggested bluntly that “objectivity… is
just one way of understanding reality” [24]. Modernist, rationalistic ways of thinking (which prevailed for 400 years and underpinned the development of industrial civilization) have lost their impetus as we enter a period of postmodernity.
It is difficult to assess the depth of this epistemological shift, not least because it is partly masked
by the persistence of elements of the modernist
paradigm locked into habits of thought, legislation,
and established practices. Nevertheless, the shift is
revealed in increasing political and legal challenges
to those practices, in the importance given to heritage preservation (modernism swept aside everything old), in the widespread acknowledgement of
the merits of differences of all kinds (modernism
celebrated uniformity), and in the empowerment of
women, Indigenous peoples, and minorities (modernism was patriarchal and colonialist).
In postmodernity, no single approach, including
scientific objectivity, is arrogated above others. Instead, there are multiple discourses to be heard and
considered. Scientific objectivity has, of course,
proven to be a particularly effective way of dealing
with the world, and Jacobs is right to suggest it
should not be quickly dismissed.
One can no longer assume, however, that scientific objectivity is the single best way to understand
the world. The postmodernist position demands that
every situation be grasped in its own terms; every
action—scientifically based or not—can be contested. Whereas modernist planning aimed to provide comprehensive solutions to what were considered universal problems, postmodernity requires
negotiated strategies adapted to specific individuals,
groups, and conditions. In other words, in both theory and practice, postmodernity is oriented to diversity and therefore to place.

sign, planning, making, doing, maintaining, caring
for, restoring, and otherwise taking responsibility
for how somewhere appears and works.
Until the 19th century, a practical sense of place
was mostly unself-conscious as towns, villages, and
farms were made without much attention to place as
an identifiable phenomenon of human existence.
Builders presumably followed some combination of
experience, necessity, tradition, and sensitivity to
site. This local distinctiveness (which we now admire as tourists or as devotees of place) developed
in large measure because it was difficult and expensive to move building materials very far. Traditions
arose for the use of whatever was locally available.
Industrialization and modernism undermined
these local practices, partly through the use of
placeless materials like iron, concrete, metal, and
glass; partly through the invention of cheap means
of transport; and partly through the invention of
styles that were self-consciously international.
Guiding design principles were efficiency and standardization.
The outcome was an “International Style”—be
it office buildings, multi-family housing, or interiors—that could fit almost anywhere. This largely
placeless approach to design peaked in the 1960s
and has faltered since, as modernism lost momentum. Today, the more dominant approach is that the
diversity of communities and places should be emphasized rather than minimized in design. How this
is to be done, however, is not entirely clear, although heritage preservation, ecosystem planning,
and a critical reinterpretation of earlier regional traditions are some of the ways offered.
What is clear is that a postmodern approach to
diversity cannot be based in a simple return to a premodern sense of place. Postmodernism may celebrate diversity in design and appearance, but air
travel, electronic communications, and standardized
technologies are invaluable for reasons of efficiency, safety, and convenience. A postmodern
sense of place is simultaneously local and extended.
I have already suggested that, although the 21st
century will present social and environmental challenges at a global scale, the individual and combined effects will be locally diverse. A practical
sense of place will need be an essential aspect of

A Practical Sense of Place
There has always been a practical aspect to sense of
place whereby it might be translated into buildings,
landscapes, and townscapes. This transformation
involves not just construction but all means of de-
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The relevance of pragmatism to a postmodern
sense of place is clear. In postmodernity, diversity is
acknowledged in all its forms, and places are the
diverse contexts of everyday life. Since there is no
longer an overarching ideology that justifies scientific approaches as better than other points of view,
new building developments and other place changes
are almost always contested. It is nevertheless essential to get things done and respond to challenges
like climate change and cultural conflict that, if
nothing is done, will undermine the quality of life
A pragmatic approach may be able to accomplish this task through careful assessment of facts
and consequences, engaging people in discussions
of the place and reaching imperfect but workable
agreements in regard to which strategies are most
appropriate for dealing with the challenges as they
impact particular places.

any strategy to mitigate the global challenges. This
practical sense of place must reflect the extensibility
of postmodern life and grasp the broader, global aspects of the challenges it confronts.
What is needed is a “pragmatic sense of place”
that integrates an appreciation of place identity with
an understanding of extensibility. A central aim
would be to seek appropriate local actions to deal
with emerging, larger-scale social and environmental challenges.

Pragmatism
Over a century ago, William James wrote that
pragmatism is “the attitude of looking away from
first things, principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits,
consequences, facts” [24]. Pragmatism is an attitude
that acknowledges change and variety: “The world
we live in exists diffused and distributed in the form
of an indefinitely numerous lot of ‘eaches’, coherent
in all sorts of ways and degrees” [25].
In founding pragmatism as a philosophical
movement, James and his contemporary, Charles S
Peirce, declared that it should not be merely practical. Rather, they saw it potentially as a philosophical means of resolving logical and methodological
confusions in science and philosophy.
Today the philosophical understanding of
pragmatism has changed. Scientific research is a
corporate and state-aided activity expected to get
practical results—a development occurring at the
same time rational, scientific arguments have lost
much of their epistemological authority. One consequence is that neo-pragmatic philosophers like
Stephen Toulmin and Richard Rorty now associate a
tone of commonsense practicality with pragmatist
philosophy. In the absence of a firm foundation for
choosing between courses of action, these philosophers suggest the best strategy is to attend to James’
realm of consequences and facts. “We have to return
to the world of where and when,” writes Toulmin,
“to get back in touch with the experience of everyday life, and manage our affairs one day at a time”
[26]. Rorty proposes that critical thinking must now
involve playing off various concrete alternative
strategies against one another rather than testing
them against criteria of rationality [27].

A Pragmatic Sense of Place
A pragmatic sense of place combines an appreciation for a locality’s uniqueness with a grasp of its
relationship to regional and global contexts. It is
simultaneously place-focused and geographically
extended. It is not a new way of thinking—in fact,
aspects of it have always been a part of place experience but are now widely latent.
A pragmatic sense of place is apparent in contrasting contexts like the designation and restoration
of World Heritage sites, locally inspired artworks
and festivals that awaken sense of place, supermarket chains that sell local produce, and advocates of
the slow-food movement and regional cuisine.
More generally, everyday life involves concerns such as health, education, pollution, and new
development—all local, practical concerns that are
part of place familiarity and affection. At the same
time, everyday life involves distant travel and economic and electronic connections around the globe.
In short, a firm basis for a pragmatic sense of place
is to be found in the experience of place and in the
background of contemporary everyday life.
It will not be easy to make explicit what many
people know implicitly and to turn this knowledge
into consistent actions. To resist the poisonous place
temptations of parochialism and exclusion, a pragmatic sense of place requires the difficult exercise
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side or the other. He identifies his own orientation as
cosmopolitan.
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Places, pp. 272–85.
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NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1997).
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14. James Howard Kunstler, The Long Emergency: Converging Catastrophes of the 21st Century (NY: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2005).
15. The UN-based Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
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strategies for adaptation to climate changes. One example is the IPCC Expert Meeting on Integration of Adaptation and Mitigation and Sustainable Development, La
Reunion, February 2005; go to:
www.ipcc.ch/activity/workshops.htm (accessed June 16,
2009).
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the21st Century (London: Continuum, 2003), p. 3.
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Cities website of the University of Loughborough;
www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/ (accessed June 16, 2009).
18. See, for example, David Ranney, Global Decision, Local
Collisions: Urban Life in the New World Order (Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univ. Press, 2003).
19. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (NY:
Anchor Books, 2000), p. 42.
20. Sandercock, Cosmopolis II, p. 3.
21. This is a major theme in Jacobs’ Dark Age Ahead.
22. Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), p. 1.
23. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1989), p. 26.
24. William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” in Pragmatism and Other Essays (NY: Washington Square Press,
1967 [originally 1906]), p. 27.
25. William James, “Pragmatism and Humanism,” in Pragmatism and Other Essays, pp. 114–16.
26. Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 213.
27. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 164.

of what might be called “cosmopolitan imagination,” which can grasp both the spirit and extensibility of places, seeing them as nodes in a web of larger processes.
Cultural conflicts, climate change, water shortages, and the effects of escalating energy costs will
not fade magically into the background, nor is it
enough to hope that muddling through will be sufficient to deal with the problems. Strategies based on
finding technical or political fixes may be possible
but are hardly wise, given that new problems will
almost certainly arise from unintended consequences of new technologies. Furthermore, there is
no way to push the epistemological genie of postmodernism back into the hermetically sealed bottle
of rationalism, so there can be no question that rationalistic, top-down solutions will be deeply contested.
Perhaps the most hopeful, reasonable strategy
for dealing with emerging social and environmental
challenges is to find ways to mitigate their effects in
particular places. This strategy requires that every
locality, place, and community must adapt differently. A pragmatic sense of place can simultaneously facilitate these adaptations, contribute to a
broader awakening of sense of place, and reinforce
the spirit of place in all its diverse manifestations.
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